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Abstract 
Does exchange rate variability affect the speed of external adjustment? We study bilateral 
trade balances for a sample of 18 European countries over the period from 1948 through 2008. 
We find that, with the introduction of the euro, trade imbalances among euro area members 
widened considerably, even after allowing for permanent asymmetries in trade 
competitiveness within pairs of countries or in the overall trade competitiveness of individual 
countries. Intra-euro area imbalances also seem to have become more persistent with the 
introduction of the euro. Greater persistence is partially linked to economic and regulatory 
inflexibilities, such as fiscal restrictions and labor market rigidities. 
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I. Introduction 
The association between exchange rate variability and the speed of current account 
adjustment is still a matter of much debate. In a now-classic article, Friedman (1953) 
famously claimed that flexible exchange rates allow the prompt and continuous change of 
relative prices and thereby facilitate rapid external adjustment. Empirical studies, in contrast, 
often find no robust relationship between the flexibility of the nominal exchange rate and the 
rate of current account reversion. In fact, Chinn and Wei (2013) even argue that Friedman’s 
hypothesis is largely a matter of faith.  
 
The determinants of current account positions and its dynamics are typically assessed 
in one of two ways. Most studies focus on a country’s aggregate external balance, often 
measured as a fraction of overall economic activity (such as gross domestic product, or GDP). 
These papers typically examine large panel data sets to characterize the variation of the 
current account and current account adjustment across countries and over time. Examples 
include, among others, Chinn and Prasad (2003) and Freund (2005). Another set of papers 
analyzes the evolution of a single country’s external position by trading partner. Examining 
patterns in bilateral trade, time-series techniques are applied to estimate structural supply and 
demand equations for exports and imports. Mann and Plück (2007) provide a recent 
application for the United States. 
 
Both empirical approaches, however, are not without difficulties. The analysis of 
country aggregates has to deal with the problem that many determinants of a country’s 
external position are bilateral in nature. For instance, our key variable of interest, exchange 
rate flexibility, is a (predominantly) pairwise feature whose effect may not be identified 
properly at the aggregate country level. Country-specific analyses, in contrast, may suffer 
from small sample size. More important, the empirical findings are often viewed as outcomes 
of a case study whose results cannot be easily generalized. 
 
In this chapter, we extend the previous work in this area along two lines. First, we 
analyze imbalances in bilateral trade relationships. While there is no economic reason to 
assume that a bilateral trade relationship should necessarily be balanced, for many countries, 
the difference between the value of shipments to and from a particular partner has risen 
sizably in recent years. More notably, large bilateral imbalances appear to increasingly 
dominate some countries’ overall trade balance, thereby raising considerable interest among 
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policy-makers and a wider public. A prominent example is the trade deficit between the 
United States and China, which now accounts for almost half the US total trade deficit. 
 
Second, following Berger and Nitsch (2010, 2011, 2013), we examine the formation of 
the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as an experiment to study the effects of 
a fixed exchange rate regime on trade imbalances. With the adoption of a common currency, 
eleven European countries irrevocably fixed their bilateral exchange rates on January 1, 1999. 
In our analysis, we analyze the patterns of trade between a sample of eighteen European 
countries (some of which adopted the euro as their common currency in recent years) over the 
period from 1948 through 2008. 
 
Previewing our main results, we find that trade imbalances—measured as the fraction 
of deficits and surpluses in total bilateral trade—have indeed widened considerably between 
euro-area member countries after the introduction of the euro. Moreover, since we control for 
various sets of country-specific and pairwise fixed effects, our analysis indicates that the 
larger imbalances are not (only) the result of enduring asymmetries in trade competitiveness 
between a given pair of countries or the consequence of changes in the institutional 
framework, financing conditions, or trends in the competitiveness of specific countries against 
all others. In addition, we establish that intra–euro area imbalances have become more 
persistent with the introduction of the euro. Interestingly, greater persistence is partially 
linked to economic and regulatory inflexibilities, such as fiscal restrictions and labor market 
rigidities. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical 
methodology and the data. The heart of the text is section 3, which presents the empirical 
results; we first examine the association between the exchange rate regime and trade 
imbalances and then analyze the persistence in trade patterns. Our findings are summarized in 
a brief concluding section, which also provides some policy conclusions. 
 
II. Methodology and Data 
Our variable of interest is the bilateral trade balance between a reporter country r and a 
partner country p, defined as the difference between r’s exports to p and r’s imports from p in 
a given year t. To account for differences in the importance of a trade relationship both across 
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partners and over time, we normalize the trade surplus or deficit by the total value of bilateral 
trade:1 
 
(1) TradeBalancerpt = (Exportsrpt – Importsrpt) / (Exportsrpt + Importsrpt) . 
 
Initially, we are interested in the effect of EMU or euro-area membership on bilateral 
trade imbalances; see also Berger and Nitsch (2010, 2011, 2013). To that end, we estimate 
variants of the regression as follows: 
 
(2) |TradeBalancerpt| =  
 +  EMUrpt {+ t t Tt} {+ rp rp RPrp} {+ rt rt Rrt} {+ pt pt Ppt} + rpt , 
 
where the regressand is the absolute value of the normalized trade balance; EMU is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if both trade partners are members of the euro area at time t 
and zero otherwise; and  is the disturbance term. We also include various combinations of 
fixed effects. In our baseline specification, we use common time fixed effects {T} to control 
for joint variations in trade imbalances over time. We also allow pairwise imbalances to 
deviate consistently from the sample average by adding pair-specific fixed effects {RP}. 
Finally, we replace the common time effects by country time-fixed effects for both reporter 
{R} and partner {P} countries to capture any dynamic country-specific features that could 
affect the countries’ overall trade position, including changes in the institutional environment, 
trends in country-specific competitiveness, or changes in the ease with which trade 
imbalances can be financed.2 Given the comprehensiveness of the set of fixed effects, this 
constitutes a fairly strong test of the hypothesis that euro-area membership will influence the 
level of trade imbalances. 
 
                                                 
1 Given our interest in the symmetry of trade relations, normalizing by total trade is the 
natural choice (rather than, for instance, normalizing by country size). Larger magnitudes of 
the variable of interest indicate greater imbalances in bilateral trade. 
2 Examples for changing institutional arrangements captured by time fixed effects include the 
country-specific effects of the “Single Market” initiative and pre-EMU exchange rate 
arrangements. Arguably, the introduction of the euro has eased the financing of trade deficits 
through tighter financial integration, and for some countries, through the decline of real 
interest rates. Time fixed effects will also capture any systematic decline in (real) exchange 
rate volatility. 
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Our main focus, however, is on the persistence of trade imbalances. In particular, we 
aim to identify country-specific features that affect the speed of adjustment of bilateral trade 
imbalances; these features may potentially include the exchange rate regime, such as EMU 
membership. Our regressions take the following general form: 
 
(3) |TradeBalancerpt| =  +  |TradeBalancerpt-1| +  Zrpt  +  Zrpt × |TradeBalancerpt-1| 
 {+ t t Tt} {+ rp rp RPrp} {+ rt rt Rrt} {+ pt pt Ppt} + rpt , 
 
where Z is the variable of interest, such as a dummy variable for joint membership in the euro 
area. For variables other than the exchange rate regime, measures are typically entered as the 
pairwise average of values of the reporter and partner country. 
 
In line with previous work on the effects of EMU on trade (Berger and Nitsch, 2008), 
our analysis focuses on a homogeneous set of eighteen European countries. The approach has 
the advantage of including countries that either share the institutional framework of the 
European Union or are closely associated with it. The sample comprises the fifteen countries 
that were members of the European Union at the time of the introduction of the euro (eleven 
of which adopted the currency from the beginning, followed by Greece in 2001), plus Iceland, 
Norway, and Switzerland. We analyze the period from 1948 to 2008. 
 
Our key source of data is the Direction of Trade Statistics from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), from which we obtained nominal values of bilateral exports and 
imports on an annual basis. Because country r’s trade balance with p is typically not identical 
to p’s inversely signed trade balance with r (e.g., because of different statistical valuation 
methods for exports and imports), we analyze the full sample of bilateral imbalances.3 Our 
trade data set is augmented with macroeconomic variables from the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Institutional 
variables are taken from the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD). Variables and sources are described in detail in the appendix to this chapter. 
                                                 
3 Restricting the sample to only one observation per country pair requires a decision on which 
observation to analyze and which to ignore. In our sensitivity analysis, we experimented with 
a number of approaches and found most results to be reasonably robust. For example, 
including only one observation per country pair while dropping any observations where 
pairwise balances differ by more than 10 percentage points between the two reporting 
countries delivers results quite similar to those tabulated below. 
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III. Empirical Results 
Figure 1 graphs the evolution of absolute trade imbalances in our sample over time. 
Two observations stand out. First, the sample average trade imbalance consistently exceeds 
the median imbalance, indicating that the distribution could be dominated by a few 
disproportionately large imbalances between country pairs. Indeed, some bilateral trade 
relationships are characterized by one-directional trade flows and, thus, high imbalances, 
especially for small countries such as Iceland, Ireland, and Greece.4 Second, median and mean 
imbalances display the same U-shaped pattern over time. There were relatively large bilateral 
trade imbalances in the Bretton Woods era (after the end of World War II until the early 
1970s), followed by a period of moderate imbalances in the 1970s and 1980s and a renewed 
increase in imbalances since the mid-1990s. Taken at face value, this pattern is consistent 
with the hypothesis that a fixed exchange rate regime is associated with larger trade 
imbalances. 
 
To illustrate this issue in more detail, Figure 2 shows the trade balances of various 
groups of countries over the same period. Specifically, we distinguish between trade 
relationships for which exchange rates were fixed with the introduction of the euro (intra-
EMU trade) and trade pairs for which nominal exchange rates remained flexible (i.e., trade 
between EMU countries and non-members as well as trade between nonmembers). 
Interestingly, the U-shaped pattern applies most strongly to trade between EMU member 
countries, while trade between nonmembers displays no clear tendency over time. Trade 
imbalances between EMU member countries and non-members show a similar but less 
pronounced U-shape. A possible explanation is that the external value of the euro, while 
flexible for the euro area as a whole, cannot adjust to individual (and possibly opposing) 
member country needs.  
 
Regression analysis confirms the association between the exchange rate regime and 
trade imbalances. Table 1 presents the benchmark estimation results. We begin with the most 
parsimonious specification of equation (2), a regression of the absolute value of bilateral trade 
imbalances on an EMU membership dummy and a comprehensive set of year fixed effects. 
As shown in the first column of the table, the estimated  coefficient on the EMU variable is 
                                                 
4 The introduction of fixed country-pair effects will limit the possible effect of outliers on our 
econometric results below. 
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positive, and with a t-statistic of 2.1, significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level; 
the point estimate of about 0.018 implies that trade imbalances between euro-area member 
countries average about 2 percentage points larger than for the rest of the sample. In the next 
column, we add a comprehensive set of pairwise fixed effects to our specification, so the 
EMU coefficient now captures only the time variation in the trade imbalance for EMU 
member countries after the adoption of the euro. The estimated coefficient not only remains 
positive and significant, but almost doubles in magnitude, reaching 0.033. This suggests that 
euro-area member countries have experienced an increase in their bilateral trade imbalances 
with other euro-area members by an average of more than 3 percentage points since the 
adoption of the common currency, which appears large compared to a sample mean of about 
0.3. Controlling instead for time-variant country-specific features in the reporter and partner 
country leaves the estimation result basically unchanged. As shown in column 3, the 
estimated effect of euro-area membership on trade imbalances remains positive, statistically 
highly significant, and economically sizable. 
 
The final three columns of Table 1 further generalize these results. The regressions 
add a dummy variable for the presence of a fixed (or unchanged) exchange rate between two 
countries other than euro area membership, along with the p-value of a t-test for similarity of 
the estimated coefficients. While the estimates of the EMU effect on trade imbalances are 
unaffected by this extension, the coefficients on the variable for other fixed exchange rates 
vary strongly across specifications. The estimated coefficient is positive and significant when 
only common time fixed effects are included, possibly reflecting some large imbalances in the 
immediate post–World War II period. After controlling for pairwise fixed effects, however, 
the coefficient falls in magnitude and becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero; it 
even changes sign (but remains insignificant) for the specification with country time fixed 
effects. This finding seems to be generally in line with observations that the effect of currency 
union membership on trade differs from the effect of fixed exchange rates on trade; see, for 
instance, Rose (2000). 
 
Our main interest, however, is in the persistence of trade account imbalances—that is, 
the speed with which imbalances revert to equilibrium after a shock. Again, we begin our 
analysis with some graphical evidence. Figure 3 shows the AR(1) coefficient from a simple 
autoregression of the trade balance, estimated over rolling five-year windows. While there is a 
general trend towards greater persistence over the sample period, the speed of adjustment 
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appears to become faster (and the autoregressive coefficients decrease in magnitude) during 
episodes of flexible exchange rates. More important, there are again notable differences in the 
adjustment patterns across groups of countries. As shown in Figure 4, trade imbalances 
among EMU member countries have become highly persistent since the late 1980s. 
 
To provide accompanying estimation results, we follow Chinn and Wei (2013) and 
apply two regression approaches to determine the effect of exchange rate invariability on 
trade. First, we stratify the sample by exchange rate regime and estimate separate regressions 
by regime. Second, we interact the lagged dependent variable with the variable of interest 
(which initially is membership in the euro area). 
 
A first set of regression results is reported in Table 2. The table contains information 
on separate regressions for different groups of countries under EMU, with increasing degrees 
of exchange rate flexibility when moving from left to right, as well as a regression for the 
EMU member countries before the introduction of the euro. Moreover, each row in the table 
tabulates the results from a different estimation specification so that, in total, coefficient 
estimates from twelve separate regressions are reported. 
 
We begin with the most parsimonious specification of an autoregression of order 1, 
allowing for year-specific intercepts only.5 For this specification, the degree of persistence for 
trade between countries that use the euro as their national currency is 0.962, as shown in the 
first column of the table. More important, persistence appears to decline gradually for trade 
between country pairs with more flexible exchange rate regimes; the point estimates fall to 
0.939 for pairwise trade involving currencies other than the euro. In contrast, there is no 
evidence of an increase in trade persistence among EMU member countries after the adoption 
of the euro. If anything, the degree of persistence has been even slightly higher in the decade 
before the introduction of the common currency, possibly reflecting already-low exchange 
rate variability. 
 
Reassuringly, the key findings turn out to be generally robust across various panel 
estimators. The differences in the speed of trade account adjustment between groups of 
country pairs become even more pronounced for more demanding specifications with 
country-specific and pairwise fixed effects. In intra-European trade after the introduction of 
                                                 
5 The inclusion of higher-order autoregressive terms provides no further insights.  
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the euro, trade imbalances between countries that still use their own national currency seem to 
be the least persistent. 
 
To further explore differences in trade persistence between pairs of countries that 
operate under different exchange rate regimes, we also present results from a more 
comprehensive estimation approach. Table 3 reports estimates for the full sample when the 
lagged dependent variable is interacted with a fixed exchange rate dummy variable. To 
economize on space, only results for the most demanding regression specification are reported, 
which includes comprehensive sets of time-varying exporter and importer fixed effects to take 
account of any factor that is specific to a particular country in a given year, as well as a 
comprehensive set of dyadic-specific fixed effects to absorb any time-invariant characteristics 
that are common to a pair of countries. 
 
Again, we find strong evidence of persistence; the autoregressive coefficient is about 
0.68 and highly statistically significant. More important, the degree of persistence is much 
higher for EMU countries. When the lagged dependent variable is interacted with EMU 
membership, the estimated coefficient is positive, statistically highly significant, and 
economically large. Taken at face value, the degree of persistence in intra–euro area 
imbalances is about 25 percent higher than elsewhere, implying an autoregressive coefficient 
of about 0.83 for EMU members. Indeed, with this extension, the coefficient on the 
noninteracted EMU dummy becomes significantly negative, suggesting that the 
disproportionately large bilateral trade imbalances under EMU are linked to a greater 
persistence of these imbalances between euro-area member countries.6 An interesting fact is 
that this result does not extend to other episodes of fixed exchange rates, as shown in 
column 2 of table 3. In line with Chinn and Wei (2013), a fixed exchange rate does not 
increase persistence automatically, a finding that we further explore below. Finally, the 
remainder of the table reports analogous estimation results for regressions in which the 
absolute value of the trade imbalance is replaced by the trade surplus and deficit as dependent 
variable. 
 
                                                 
6 Higher persistence means that trade balance shocks will linger longer and can accumulate, 
among other possible effects. In a regression with only a lagged endogenous variable and the 
EMU dummy, the latter is rendered insignificant (not reported). 
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Next, we examine the effect of other inflexibilities on the persistence in bilateral trade 
patterns. We begin with two measures that roughly describe the economic environment for 
any pair of countries: average economic growth and aggregate fiscal position. Berger and 
Nitsch (2010) find that countries with relatively strong growth, a relatively low volatility of 
the national business cycle, and relatively higher fiscal deficits exhibit systematically lower 
trade surpluses than others. We examine the effect of these factors on trade persistence in the 
simplest possible way. 
 
As before, we begin by estimating variants of equation (3) for samples stratified by 
exchange rate regime. Table 4 presents the results. In the upper part of the table, we analyze 
the effect of economic growth on the degree of trade persistence. Not surprisingly, the 
autoregressive parameter is again positive, economically large, and statistically significant, 
providing strong evidence of persistence in pairwise trade imbalances. Similarly, the positive 
coefficient on the pairwise average of GDP growth indicates that fast-growing country pairs 
tend to exhibit relatively large imbalances, although the coefficient is not always significantly 
different from zero. The key variable of interest, however, is the interaction term. Under EMU, 
the estimated coefficient on this variable takes a negative and statistically significant value, 
implying that country pairs with anemic growth tend to experience more persistent trade 
imbalances. No similar pattern is observed for country pairs operating under different 
exchange rate regimes, including the episode of EMU countries before the adoption of the 
euro. As a result, economic conditions appear to matter strongly for the speed of trade account 
adjustment under a fixed exchange rate. 
 
The lower part of table 4 presents analogous results for the effect of the average fiscal 
position of a country pair on bilateral trade persistence. While aggregate fiscal policies have, 
at best, only a moderate effect on the level of pairwise trade imbalances, trade surpluses and 
deficits become relatively more persistent for country pairs in the euro area with large budget 
deficits. While the estimated coefficient on the interaction term is consistently negative across 
samples, under EMU, the point estimate is different from zero at a conventional level of 
statistical significance. In sum, the results strongly indicate that some of the greater 
persistence of trade imbalances for euro-area member countries can be linked to general 
economic conditions. 
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Our findings are broadly confirmed when the full sample is analyzed. Table 5 contains 
the results. Again, we tabulate only the results for the specification with full sets of exporter, 
importer, and dyadic fixed effects. The main difference between these results and our default 
model in table 3, however, is that the key variable of interest is now the coefficient on the 
triple interaction term. The coefficient captures the extent to which persistence in the euro 
area is affected by economic variables. While the results on GDP growth are inconsistent 
across specifications, the coefficient on the pairwise budgetary position is significantly 
negative, indicating that trade imbalances have become significantly more persistent for EMU 
member countries with large fiscal deficits after the introduction of the euro.  
 
In another perturbation, we replace economic measures with institutional variables. 
More specifically, we examine the effect that rigidities of labor and product markets have on 
trade persistence. Berger and Nitsch (2010, 2011) find that external imbalances are affected 
by measures representing the regulation of adjustment, especially for country pairs that use 
the same currency. Figure 5 provides some graphical illustration for the pairwise differences 
in employment protection and product market regulation. 
 
Table 6 is an analogue to table 4 for these institutional measures. Apart from the 
autoregressive parameters (which are always economically and statistically significant), few 
estimated coefficients differ from zero. Most notably, however, there is a strong positive 
effect of employment protection on the degree of persistence of trade imbalances for EMU 
member countries, an effect that is not observed for other exchange rate regimes. 
 
Similar findings are obtained when we analyze the full sample and report the results in 
table 7. The key finding of these regressions is that higher levels of employment protection 
tend to be associated with greater persistence of trade imbalances among euro-area countries. 
Based on the results from the fully specified model in column 3, the autoregressive coefficient 
increases by about 0.09 for each unit increase in the pairwise average of the OECD 
employment regulation measure (that ranges from 1 to 6). In summary, our results indicate 
that after adoption of the euro, euro-area member countries with more rigid labor market 
institutions exhibited statistically and economically significantly lower rates of reversion in 
their trade account imbalances. For instance, a reduction of employment protection levels 
from the sample mean of 2.4 to the sample low of 0.8 would reduce persistence by about 0.15, 
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all other things being equal. This difference is equivalent to the deviation of the degree of 
persistence among EMU countries from the sample average. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
In this chapter, we explored evidence from the introduction of the euro to identify the 
effect of (irrevocably) fixed nominal exchange rates on the magnitude and persistence of trade 
imbalances. Specifically, we examined the evolution of bilateral trade imbalances between 
euro-area member countries compared to pairwise balances for countries with (in principle) 
flexible exchange rates. Although bilateral trade relationships need not necessarily be 
balanced, the emergence of large and persistent trade imbalances between a pair of countries 
may reflect underlying policy tensions or rigidities, most notably the absence of nominal 
exchange rate flexibility. 
 
We provided consistent evidence that imbalances in trade among euro-area member 
countries have indeed both widened markedly and become more persistent after the 
introduction of the common currency. Fixed nominal exchange rates appear to lengthen the 
impact of shocks on external accounts. 
 
In addition, we examined the effects of inflexibilities other than exchange rate 
invariability. For instance, the lack of an adjustable nominal exchange rate supposedly poses a 
particular problem for pairs of countries that also operate a single and unrestricted market for 
goods and services, such as the euro area. In this case, the permanently fixed nominal 
exchange rate forces real exchange rate adjustment through relative price levels alone, which 
can be difficult in the presence of rigidities in national goods and labor markets. 
 
Our results strongly confirmed that economic conditions, as well as policy and market 
institutions, affect the speed of external adjustment, particularly when the nominal exchange 
rate is fixed. Trade imbalances tend to be less persistent for country pairs with relatively high 
economic growth rates and prudent fiscal policies. Also, country pairs with higher average 
levels of employment protection tend to display long-lasting trade imbalances. 
 
In line with our previous findings in Berger and Nitsch (2010, 2011, 2013), our results 
imply both bad and good news for policymakers. The bad news is that irrevocably fixed 
nominal exchange rates come at the cost of larger and more permanent trade imbalances, just 
12 
 
as Friedman (1953) claimed more than half a century ago. The good news is that these 
imbalances are not completely unavoidable. With a fixed exchange rate, the more flexible the 
national labor and product markets are, trade imbalances are all the smaller and their 
adjustment to shocks all the faster. 
 
13 
 
References: 
 
Berger, Helge, and Volker Nitsch, 2008, “Zooming Out: The Trade Effect of the Euro in 
Historical Perspective,” Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 28, Issue 8, 
pp.1244–1260. 
———, 2010, “The Euro’s Effect on Trade Imbalances,” IMF Working Paper, No. 10/226. 
———, 2011, “Inflexibilities and Trade Imbalances: Evidence from Europe,” in Wim 
Meeusen (eds.), The Economic Crisis and European Integration (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing), pp. 141–153. 
———, 2013, “Bilateral Imbalances in Europe,” CESifo Economic Studies, forthcoming. 
Chinn, Menzie, and Eswar Prasad, 2003, “Medium-Term Determinants of Current Accounts 
in Industrial and Developing Countries: An Empirical Exploration,” Journal of 
International Economics, Vol. 59, pp. 47–76. 
Chinn, Menzie, and Shang-Jin Wei, 2013, “A Faith-based Initiative Meets the Evidence: Does 
a Flexible Exchange Rate Regime Really Facilitate Current Account Adjustment?” 
Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 95, pp. 168–184. 
Clarida, Richard, 2007, G7 Current Account Imbalances: Sustainability and Adjustment? 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press). 
Freund, Caroline, 2005, “Current Account Adjustment in Industrial Countries,” Journal of 
International Money and Finance, Vol. 24, pp. 1278–1298. 
Friedman, Milton, 1953, “The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates,” in Milton Friedman, 
Essays in Positive Economics, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press), pp. 157–
203. 
Mann, Catherine L. and Katharina Plück, 2007, “Understanding the U.S. Trade Deficit: A 
Disaggregated Perspective,” in Richard H. Clarida, G7 Current Account Imbalances: 
Sustainability and Adjustment, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press), pp. 247–
282. 
Rose, Andrew, 1990, “Exchange Rates and the Trade Balance. Some Evidence from 
Developing Countries,” Economics Letters, Vol. 34, pp. 271–275. 
———, 2000, “One Money, One Market: The Effect of Common Currencies on Trade,” 
Economic Policy, Vol. 30, pp. 7–45. 
 
14 
 
Figure 1: Bilateral Trade Imbalances over Time 
 
 
.1
5
.2
.2
5
.3
.3
5
Tr
ad
e 
im
ba
la
nc
e 
as
 fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 to
ta
l b
ila
te
ra
l t
ra
de
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
mean median
 
 
Notes: The figure graphs the absolute difference between a country’s exports and imports 
with a partner as a fraction of total bilateral trade (exports plus imports) for a sample of 
18 European countries. Data are taken from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics. 
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Figure 2: Bilateral Trade Imbalances by Group of Country Pairs 
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Notes: The figure graphs the average absolute difference between a country’s exports and 
imports with a partner as a fraction of total bilateral trade (exports plus imports) for various 
groups of country pairs. Data are taken from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics. 
 
 
16 
 
Figure 3: Persistence of Bilateral Trade Imbalances over Time 
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Notes: The figure graphs the estimated AR(1) coefficients for the absolute difference between 
a country’s exports and imports with a partner as a fraction of total bilateral trade (exports 
plus imports) over rolling 5-year windows. Data are taken from the IMF’s Direction of Trade 
Statistics. 
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Figure 4: Persistence of Bilateral Trade Imbalances by Group of Country Pairs 
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Notes: The figures graph the estimated AR(1) coefficients for the absolute difference between 
a country’s exports and imports with a partner as a fraction of total bilateral trade (exports 
plus imports) over rolling 5-year windows for various groups of country pairs. Data are taken 
from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics. 
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Figure 5: Trade Imbalances and Regulation 
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Notes: Filled circles mark country pairs where both partners are/become EMU members. 
 
19 
 
Table 1: Trade Imbalances under Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
       
EMU  0.018* 
(0.009) 
 0.033** 
(0.007) 
 0.035** 
(0.015) 
 0.020* 
(0.009) 
 0.032** 
(0.007) 
 0.035* 
(0.016) 
Other fixed 
exchange rate 
    0.050** 
(0.007) 
 0.013** 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
       
Common time fixed 
effects? 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Pairwise fixed 
effects? 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Country time fixed 
effects? 
No No Yes No No Yes 
Number of 
observations 
16,491 16,491 16,491 15,965 15,965 15,965 
Adj. R2 0.02 0.53 0.63 0.02 0.53 0.64 
P-value: 
EMU=Other fixed 
   0.008 0.028 0.034 
 
Notes: OLS regression. Dependent variable is the absolute trade imbalance as a fraction of 
total bilateral trade. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. **, * and # denote 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 2: Persistence of Trade Imbalances by Group of Country Pairs 
 
 
     
Sample EMU Outside 
EMU 
No EMU 
country 
EMU 
Period 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008 1989-1998 
     
 Time fixed effects 
Lagged trade 
imbalance 
 0.962 
(0.008) 
 0.939 
(0.011) 
 0.936 
(0.028) 
 0.971 
(0.011) 
Adj. R2 0.92 0.85 0.82 0.89 
     
 Time and pairwise fixed effects 
Lagged trade 
imbalance 
 0.583 
(0.038) 
 0.436 
(0.041) 
 0.358 
(0.102) 
 0.602 
(0.041) 
Adj. R2 0.93 0.88 0.87 0.91 
     
 Pairwise and time-varying country fixed effects 
Lagged trade 
imbalance 
 0.578 
(0.042) 
 0.440 
(0.042) 
 0.368 
(0.105) 
 0.604 
(0.041) 
Adj. R2 0.93 0.88 0.86 0.91 
     
Number of 
observations 
1,060 1,660 300 1,100 
 
Notes: OLS regression. Dependent variable is the absolute trade imbalance as a fraction of 
total bilateral trade. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All coefficients are 
significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 3: Persistence of Trade Imbalances by Exchange Rate Regime 
 
 
     
 Imbalance Surplus/Deficit 
Lagged trade 
imbalance 
 0.675** 
(0.009) 
 0.677** 
(0.010) 
 0.734** 
(0.013) 
 0.735** 
(0.013) 
Lagged trade 
imbalance × EMU 
 0.159** 
(0.018) 
 0.171** 
(0.019) 
 0.076** 
(0.017) 
 0.077** 
(0.017) 
EMU -0.040** 
(0.010) 
-0.044** 
(0.010) 
  
Lagged trade 
imbalance × Other 
fixed exch. rate 
 -0.020 
(0.016) 
 -0.017 
(0.014) 
Other fixed exch. 
rate 
  0.012# 
(0.006) 
  
     
Number of 
observations 
16,194 15,932 16,194 15,932 
Adj. R2 0.81 0.81 0.89 0.89 
 
Notes: OLS regression. Dependent variable is listed on the top of each column. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ** and # denote significant at the 1% and 10% 
level, respectively. Country specific time and country-pair fixed effects are included but not 
reported. 
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Table 4: Economic Environment and Persistence by Group of Country Pairs 
 
 
     
Sample EMU Outside 
EMU 
No EMU 
country 
EMU 
Period 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008 1989-1998 
     
Lagged trade 
imbalance 
 1.002** 
(0.016) 
 0.938** 
(0.022) 
 0.865** 
(0.046) 
 0.980** 
(0.019) 
Lagged trade 
imbalance × 
Average real GDP 
growth 
-0.016* 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
 0.015 
(0.013) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
Average real GDP 
growth 
 0.008# 
(0.004) 
 0.010** 
(0.003) 
 0.023# 
(0.012) 
 0.003 
(0.003) 
     
Number of 
observations 
1,060 1,660 300 1,080 
Adj. R2 0.92 0.86 0.83 0.89 
 
 
 
     
Sample EMU Outside 
EMU 
No EMU 
country 
EMU 
Period 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008 1989-1998 
     
Lagged trade 
imbalance 
 0.914** 
(0.016) 
 0.948** 
(0.010) 
 0.985** 
(0.030) 
 0.961 
(0.027) 
Lagged trade 
imbalance × 
Average budget 
balance (% GDP) 
-0.022** 
(0.006) 
-0.009# 
(0.005) 
-0.015 
(0.013) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
Average budget 
balance (% GDP) 
 0.003 
(0.002) 
 0.004* 
(0.002) 
 0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
     
Number of 
observations 
864 1,536 300 900 
Adj. R2 0.91 0.86 0.82 0.90 
 
Notes: OLS regression. Dependent variable is the absolute trade imbalance as a fraction of 
total bilateral trade. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. **, * and # denote 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Common time fixed effects are always 
included, but not reported. 
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Table 5: Economic Environment and Persistence of Trade Imbalances 
 
       
Lagged trade 
imbalance 
 0.755** 
(0.012) 
 0.749** 
(0.012) 
 0.740** 
(0.013) 
 0.717** 
(0.013) 
 0.712** 
(0.013) 
 0.710** 
(0.014) 
Lagged trade 
imbalance × 
Average real GDP 
growth  
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
   
Average real GDP 
growth  
 0.003* 
(0.001) 
 0.002* 
(0.001) 
 0.002* 
(0.001) 
   
Lagged trade 
imbalance × 
Average real GDP 
growth × EMU 
  0.015** 
(0.002) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
   
Lagged trade 
imbalance × 
Average budget 
balance (% GDP) 
    0.002 
(0.003) 
 0.003 
(0.003) 
 0.002 
(0.003) 
Average budget 
balance (% GDP) 
    0.003** 
(0.001) 
 0.003** 
(0.001) 
 0.003** 
(0.001) 
Lagged trade 
imbalance × 
Average budget 
balance (% GDP) × 
EMU 
    -0.016** 
(0.003) 
-0.014** 
(0.004) 
Lagged trade 
imbalance × EMU 
   0.112** 
(0.018) 
   0.026 
(0.019) 
EMU   -0.012* 
(0.006) 
  -0.011 
(0.007) 
       
Number of 
observations 
12,292 12,292 12,292 7,406 7,406 7,406 
Adj. R2 0.83 0.83 0.81 0.85 0.85 0.85 
 
Notes: OLS regression. Dependent variable is the absolute trade imbalance as a fraction of 
total bilateral trade. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Year-specific reporter 
and partner fixed effects and time-invariant pairwise fixed effects are always included, but not 
reported. 
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Table 6: Regulatory Environment and Persistence by Group of Country Pairs 
 
 
     
Sample EMU Outside 
EMU 
No EMU 
country 
EMU 
Period 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008 1989-1998 
     
Lagged trade 
imbalance 
 0.796** 
(0.073) 
 1.000** 
(0.011) 
 1.842** 
(0.463) 
 0.930** 
(0.062) 
Lagged trade 
imbalance × 
Average 
employment 
protection 
 0.034* 
(0.015) 
-0.014 
(0.010) 
-0.271# 
(0.143) 
 0.007 
(0.010) 
Average 
employment 
protection 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
 0.006# 
(0.004) 
 0.035# 
(0.021) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
     
Number of 
observations 
864 1,266 210 900 
Adj. R2 0.91 0.86 0.81 0.90 
 
 
 
     
Sample EMU Outside 
EMU 
No EMU 
country 
EMU 
Period 1999-2008 1999-2008 1999-2008 1989-1998 
     
Lagged trade 
imbalance 
 1.083** 
(0.117) 
 0.944** 
(0.111) 
 0.599* 
(0.283) 
 0.755** 
(0.011) 
Lagged trade 
imbalance × 
Average product 
market regulation 
-0.043 
(0.034) 
 0.012 
(0.042) 
 0.165 
(0.116) 
 0.041 
(0.055) 
Average product 
market regulation 
 0.031# 
(0.018) 
 0.011 
(0.026) 
-0.058# 
(0.021) 
-0.006 
(0.022) 
     
Number of 
observations 
180 300 60 90 
Adj. R2 0.92 0.88 0.91 0.90 
 
Notes: OLS regression. Dependent variable is the absolute trade imbalance as a fraction of 
total bilateral trade. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. **, * and # denote 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Common time fixed effects are always 
included, but not reported. 
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Table 7: Regulatory Environment and Persistence of Trade Imbalances 
 
       
Lagged trade 
imbalance 
 0.756** 
(0.046) 
 0.746** 
(0.046) 
 0.761** 
(0.046) 
 0.643** 
(0.100) 
 0.658** 
(0.103) 
 0.606** 
(0.114) 
Lagged trade 
imbalance × 
Average 
employment 
protection 
-0.029 
(0.018) 
-0.027 
(0.017) 
-0.034# 
(0.018) 
   
Average 
employment 
protection 
 0.100** 
(0.017) 
 0.100** 
(0.013) 
 0.054** 
(0.013) 
   
Lagged trade 
imbalance × 
Average 
employment 
protection × EMU 
  0.012# 
(0.007) 
 0.088** 
(0.024) 
   
Lagged trade 
imbalance × 
Average product 
market regulation 
    0.000 
(0.057) 
-0.004 
(0.057) 
 0.020 
(0.061) 
Average product 
market regulation 
   -0.127 
(0.144) 
 0.227** 
(0.082) 
 0.319* 
(0.125) 
Lagged trade 
imbalance × 
Average product 
market regulation 
× EMU 
    -0.020 
(0.028) 
-0.115 
(0.101) 
Lagged trade 
imbalance × EMU 
  -0.171** 
(0.060) 
   0.199 
(0.180) 
EMU   -0.021# 
(0.011) 
  -0.028 
(0.031) 
       
Number of 
observations 
5,059 5,059 5,059 720 720 720 
Adj. R2 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.94 0.94 0.95 
 
Notes: OLS regression. Dependent variable is the absolute trade imbalance as a fraction of 
total bilateral trade. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Year-specific reporter 
and partner fixed effects and time-invariant pairwise fixed effects are always included, but not 
reported. 
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Appendix: Data Description 
 
 
Variable Description Source Period 
Trade balance (Exports-Imports)/ 
(Exports+Imports)  
IMF Direction of 
Trade Statistics 
1948-2008 
EMU Dummy for common  
membership in euro area (time-
variant) 
 1948-2008 
Other fixed exchange 
rate 
Dummy for exchange rate 
volatility < 0.1 in a given year 
 1948-2008 
Real GDP growth Real GDP growth IMF International 
Financial Statistics 
1948-2008 
Real GDP growth 
volatility 
Standard deviation of real GDP 
growth over period of 4 years 
before and after a given year 
IMF International 
Financial Statistics 
1948-2008 
Budget balance  
(% GDP) 
General government 
balance/GDP 
IMF International 
Financial Statistics 
1960-2008 
Employment 
protection 
Strictness of employment 
protection 
OECD 1985-2008 
Regular employment Sub-indicator for dismissal of 
employees on regular contracts 
OECD 1985-2008 
Temporary 
employment 
Sub-indicator for strictness of 
regulation on temporary contracts
OECD 1985-2008 
Collective dismissal Sub-indicator for additional 
regulation of collective dismissal 
OECD 1998-2008 
Product market 
regulation 
Product market regulation OECD 1998, 
2003, 2008
Administrative 
regulation 
Sub-indicator for administrative 
regulation 
OECD 1998, 
2003, 2008
Domestic economic 
regulation 
Sub-indicator for domestic 
economic regulation 
OECD 1998, 
2003, 2008
State control Sub-indicator for state control OECD 1998, 
2003, 2008
Barriers to 
entrepreneurship 
Sub-indicator for barriers to 
entrepreneurship 
OECD 1998, 
2003, 2008
Barriers to trade & 
investment 
Sub-indicator for barriers to trade 
and investment 
OECD 1998, 
2003, 2008
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